forked from rojo-rbx/rojo
Add origin/host validation and warning for exposed serves (#1270)
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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//! Defines Rojo's HTTP API, all under /api. These endpoints generally return
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//! JSON.
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use std::{collections::HashMap, fs, path::PathBuf, str::FromStr, sync::Arc};
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use std::{collections::HashMap, fs, net::SocketAddr, path::PathBuf, str::FromStr, sync::Arc};
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use futures::{sink::SinkExt, stream::StreamExt};
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use hyper::{body, Body, Method, Request, Response, StatusCode};
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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::{
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ServerInfoResponse, SocketPacket, SocketPacketBody, SocketPacketType, SubscribeMessage,
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WriteRequest, WriteResponse, PROTOCOL_VERSION, SERVER_VERSION,
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},
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origin::canonical,
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util::{deserialize_msgpack, msgpack, msgpack_ok, serialize_msgpack},
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},
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web_api::{
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@@ -28,8 +29,12 @@ use crate::{
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},
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};
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pub async fn call(serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>, mut request: Request<Body>) -> Response<Body> {
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let service = ApiService::new(serve_session);
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pub async fn call(
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serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>,
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remote_addr: SocketAddr,
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mut request: Request<Body>,
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) -> Response<Body> {
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let service = ApiService::new(serve_session, remote_addr);
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match (request.method(), request.uri().path()) {
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(&Method::GET, "/api/rojo") => service.handle_api_rojo().await,
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@@ -65,11 +70,15 @@ pub async fn call(serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>, mut request: Request<Body>)
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pub struct ApiService {
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serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>,
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remote_addr: SocketAddr,
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}
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impl ApiService {
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pub fn new(serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>) -> Self {
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ApiService { serve_session }
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pub fn new(serve_session: Arc<ServeSession>, remote_addr: SocketAddr) -> Self {
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ApiService {
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serve_session,
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remote_addr,
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}
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}
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/// Get a summary of information about the server
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@@ -348,6 +357,30 @@ impl ApiService {
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/// Open a script with the given ID in the user's default text editor.
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async fn handle_api_open(&self, request: Request<Body>) -> Response<Body> {
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// Opening a file launches a local program, so it must never be reachable
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// by a remote client even when the server is bound to an exposed address.
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//
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// `remote_addr` is the immediate peer, which is the best locality signal
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// we have: the legitimate caller is a sandboxed Roblox plugin whose only
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// credential is being able to reach the port, so there is no secret to
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// authenticate it with. A connection forwarded over loopback by an
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// SSH/Tailscale tunnel or a local reverse proxy therefore appears local
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// and is allowed. That is delegated trust rather than a bypass: by
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// standing up that tunnel or proxy the user has decided the remote end is
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// trusted, and reachability is bounded by that hop's own authentication
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// (e.g. SSH keys or Tailscale ACLs). This gate only stops direct,
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// unauthenticated peers.
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//
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// An IPv4 client reaching a dual-stack (`::`) bind appears as an
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// IPv4-mapped IPv6 peer (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`), so canonicalize to the bare
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// IPv4 form before the loopback test, matching `origin`'s handling.
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if !canonical(self.remote_addr.ip()).is_loopback() {
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return msgpack(
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ErrorResponse::forbidden("/api/open is only available to local clients"),
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StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
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);
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}
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let argument = &request.uri().path()["/api/open/".len()..];
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let requested_id = match Ref::from_str(argument) {
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Ok(id) => id,
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